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SHINING A LIGHT ON RATTLEY: THE
TROUBLESOME DILIGENT SEARCH STANDARD
UNDERCUTTING NEW YORK’S FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION LAW
Isaac A. Krier*
New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) provides citizens with
access to the documents, statistics, and information relied on by New York
State government agencies. Modeled after the federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), New York legislators designed the state’s “sunshine
law” to promote transparency and accountability through a presumption of
disclosure by requiring agencies to make all records available to the public
except those specifically exempted by statute. But state agencies often rely
on a separate, unceremonious reason to deny FOIL requests—they cannot
find the documents. FOIL requires an agency to certify that it performed a
diligent records search to justify such a denial, but a 2001 holding by the
New York Court of Appeals in Rattley v. New York City Police Department
permits agencies to properly deny a request in this manner without
describing the search or offering a statement from the individual who
personally performed the search. Despite FOIL’s promise of transparency
and disclosure, an agency’s ability to deny a records request under Rattley
without explaining its search efforts leaves requesters without their
requested records and without meaningful recourse to challenge the
agency’s alleged search in court. This Note argues that the Rattley standard
used in New York state courts renders FOIL’s diligent search requirement
entirely toothless, creates an inequitable burden-shifting framework for the
agency and the requester, and contradicts FOIL’s original legislative intent
to promote disclosure. This Note further argues that the New York Court of
Appeals should replace Rattley with the federal courts’ reasonableness test
and suggests a legislative fix to resolve FOIL’s statutory ambiguity
regarding the diligent search certification requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
An incarcerated individual sits behind bars. Their trial results in a
conviction and their appeal is unsuccessful—yet the incarcerated individual
maintains their innocence. They submit a records request to the New York
City Police Department (NYPD) for specific documents related to their
conviction.1 The NYPD acknowledges receipt of the request and provides a
deadline for its response but never responds to either the initial request or the
incarcerated individual’s subsequent administrative appeal.2 Frustrated with
the NYPD’s lack of response, the incarcerated individual commences a court
proceeding to challenge the NYPD’s constructive denial of the request.3
Only then does the NYPD respond: after several weeks, the NYPD informs
the incarcerated individual that while it did find some of the documents, it
could not find other requested records.4
The NYPD then moves to dismiss the proceeding altogether.5 To support
its denial, the NYPD’s legal counsel states that the agency could not find the
documents despite a “thorough and diligent search.”6 The incarcerated
individual nevertheless persists in challenging the agency’s inability to find
documents relating to their conviction, especially since the affirmation
contained no description of the search performed and because the NYPD’s

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 57 (N.Y. 2001).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 57–58.
See id.
Id. at 57.
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counsel did not personally conduct the search.7 Fortunately, the case comes
before New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals.8 Unfortunately, the
court holds that the denial was proper—the NYPD need not provide the
incarcerated individual with a detailed description of the search or a
statement from the person who actually conducted the search.9
In another case nineteen years later, a New York public policy center files
a request with the state’s Department of Health (DOH) to get the count of
nursing home residents who died from COVID-19.10 The DOH stalls for
months, even though their emergency response system requires a daily report
from nursing homes totaling all resident deaths from COVID-19.11 The
DOH provides a reason for the delay: the agency is still conducting a diligent
search for the records.12 After a delay lasting seven months, the policy center
secures a legal win when a New York state supreme court holds that the
DOH’s reasons for delay are inadequate and orders the DOH to turn over the
requested records.13 The policy center files further separate requests for
COVID-19 statistics with the DOH several months later.14 Again, the DOH
responds that the statistics will be delayed.15 The reason? The DOH needs
more time to complete a diligent search.16
In New York, incarcerated individuals requesting records related to their
convictions,17 public policy centers investigating the COVID-19 pandemic
7. See id.
8. See id. at 56–58.
9. See id. at 58.
10. See Empire Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 150 N.Y.S.3d 497, 497
(Sup. Ct. 2021); Bill Hammond, The Health Department Stalls a FOIL Request for the
Full COVID Death Toll in Nursing Homes, EMPIRE CTR. (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/the-health-department-stalls-a-foil/
[https://perma.cc/97F6-DKBE].
11. See Empire Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 501.
12. See Letter from Rosemarie Hewig, Recs. Access Officer, N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, to
Bill Hammond, Senior Fellow for Health Pol’y, Empire Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.empirecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FOIL-response.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HF9P-RSJ6].
13. See Empire Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 505–07; see also Press Release,
Empire Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y, NY Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Empire Center Petition for
Complete Nursing Home Information (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.empirecenter.org/
publications/court-rules-in-favor-of-empire-center-for-nursing-home-info/ [https://perma.cc/
7QAM-NAJS].
14. See Press Release, Empire Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y, Empire Center Demands Dozens of
Coronavirus Data Sets from the NYS DOH (June 22, 2021), https://www.empirecenter.org/
publications/empire-center-demands-dozens-of-coronavirus-data-sets/
[https://perma.cc/P8J6-VR6A].
15. See Bill Hammond, The Health Department’s FOIL Responses Signal an Indefinite
Wait for Pandemic Data, EMPIRE CTR. (July 23, 2021), https://www.empirecenter.org/
publications/the-health-departments-foil-responses/ [https://perma.cc/8D8Q-UQW3].
16. See id.
17. See Stan Johnson, Brianna Lorenzana, Cristyn Mingo, Arlenis Pena, Rickie Quansah,
Kayla Ray, Adaury Rodriguez & Nickie Uwoghiren, Inmates Want Files to Prove Innocence.
DA Can’t Find Them., CITY LIMITS (Jan. 21, 2016), https://citylimits.org/2016/01/21/inmateswant-files-to-prove-innocence-da-cant-find-them/ [https://perma.cc/5F6K-MC3M]; Jarrett
Murphy, Delays, Denials, Documents That Disappear?: Survey Reveals Range of Concerns
About FOIL in NYC, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 21, 2016), https://citylimits.org/2019/03/26/delays-
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in the state,18 and everyday citizens curious about what their government is
up to all utilize the same legislative sunshine law19: the New York State
Freedom of Information Law20 (FOIL). Modeled after the federal Freedom
of Information Act21 (FOIA), FOIL was passed by the New York legislature
in 197422 to grant citizens the right to request documents and access
information held by government agencies.23 FOIL’s original legislative
intent section declared that “government is the public’s business and that the
public . . . should have unimpaired access to the records of government.”24
To this end, a presumption of disclosure from state agencies to citizens
underlies FOIL—agencies subject to FOIL must make all records available
to the public except those specifically exempted by statute.25 Yet despite
FOIL’s promise of broad public access,26 citizens requesting information
using FOIL often face inordinate delays and receive inadequate responses
from government agencies.27 And, as evidenced by the two examples above
and numerous other cases, government agencies often supply an abrupt
response to explain their FOIL request denials: they cannot find the

denials-documents-that-disappear-survey-reveals-range-of-concerns-about-foil-in-nyc/
[https://perma.cc/8X2Z-ASXT].
18. See Hammond, supra note 10; see also Jeanmarie Evelly, Access to Public
Information in the Age of COVID-19, CITY LIMITS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://citylimits.org/
2021/03/26/access-to-public-information-in-the-age-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/MHL2YX27] (highlighting that government agencies have cited COVID-19 as the reason for delays
in FOIL and FOIA requests at the New York and federal levels, respectively).
19. A “sunshine law” is a common term used to describe a state’s freedom of information
law, and different states use different terminology for their state law granting citizens the right
to request documents from government agencies. See Justin Cox, Maximizing Information’s
Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13 CUNY L. REV. 387, 412–13 & n.117
(2010); see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 2d prtg. 1914) (1913) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants . . . .”).
20. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (McKinney 2022).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552; see also Ralph J. Marino, The New York Freedom of Information Law,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 83 (1974) (noting that New York’s FOIL is modeled after the federal
FOIA).
22. See Freedom of Information Law, ch. 578, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1538 (codified at N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 85–89 (McKinney 1974) (current version at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90
(McKinney 2022))).
23. See id. at 1538.
24. Id. The language of the diligent search standard from the 1977 FOIL, which this Note
analyzes, has not been amended since 1977. Compare Freedom of Information Law, ch. 933,
1977 N.Y. Laws 1, 4 (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney 1977) (current
version at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney 2022))), with PUB. OFF. § 89(3).
25. See PUB. OFF. §§ 84, 87(2); Hepps v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 122 N.Y.S.3d 446,
450–51 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2020); Goyer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, 813
N.Y.S.2d 628, 633–34 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
26. See PUB. OFF. § 84.
27. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 17; Evelly, supra note 18; see also Nate Jones, Public
Records Requests Fall Victim to the Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2020,
9:01 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/public-records-requests-fallvictim-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic/2020/10/01/cba2500c-b7a5-11ea-a8da-693df3d7674a_
story.html [https://perma.cc/FMD2-YEEJ] (providing numerous examples of COVID-19
delaying state and federal agency responses to freedom of information requests).
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documents.28 Agencies can lawfully deny records requests for several
reasons,29 but this Note focuses on one particular reason: when an agency
“certif[ies] . . . that such record cannot be found after diligent search.”30
FOIL does not specify how an agency must certify that it performed a
diligent search.31 In light of FOIL’s statutory ambiguity, in 2001, the New
York Court of Appeals32 held in Rattley v. New York City Police
Department33 that an agency does not need to provide a “detailed description
of the search” or a “personal statement from the person who actually
conducted the search” to certify that it performed a diligent search.34 In
practice, the Rattley standard allows agencies to meet their FOIL burden by
simply stating that a diligent search turned up empty, without having to
describe the search or include statements from those who actually performed
the search.35
By contrast, federal courts interpreting FOIL’s precursor and analogue,
FOIA, impose a different burden on agencies to initially demonstrate that
they have conducted an adequate search for documents. In 1983, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia established a reasonableness
test: the agency must show that it has “conducted a search reasonably
calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”36 A federal agency can meet
this burden by producing a “reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the
search terms and the type of search performed.”37 An affidavit lacking any
detail will not satisfy the federal agency’s burden.38 Although FOIL’s
drafters directly modeled the New York statute after FOIA, 39 the New York
Court of Appeals’s Rattley standard carves a significantly easier path for
agencies to deny records requests in New York.40 As a result, FOIL
requesters—including incarcerated individuals, public policy organizations,
28. See, e.g., Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 57–58 (N.Y. 2001); McGee
v. Bishop, 145 N.Y.S.3d 627, 631 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2021); see also Johnson et al., supra
note 17.
29. See infra text accompanying note 73.
30. PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a).
31. See id.; Rattley, 756 N.E.2d at 58.
32. The New York Court of Appeals is New York State’s highest court. This Note refers
to New York’s highest court as both the “New York Court of Appeals” and the “Court of
Appeals.”
33. 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
34. Id. at 58.
35. See id. See generally Jackson v. Albany Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 113 N.Y.S.3d 313
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2019); McFadden v. Fonda, 50 N.Y.S.3d 605 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2017);
Oddone v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 946 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012);
Leibowicz v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 919 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011);
Curry v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 893 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010); see also
infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3.
36. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
37. Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also
Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The agency’s affidavits, naturally, must
be ‘relatively detailed’ and nonconclusory and must be submitted in good faith.” (quoting
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973))).
38. See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
39. See Marino, supra note 21, at 83.
40. Compare Rattley, 756 N.E.2d at 58, with Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351.
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and everyday New Yorkers—are often left without their requested
documents, without an explanation of the agency’s search, and without
meaningful legal recourse to challenge the agency’s contention through a
review of the denial.41
This Note contends that the New York Court of Appeals misconstrued
FOIL’s certification requirement in Rattley by tipping the scales too far in
favor of the agency and against the citizen. This construction renders FOIL’s
presumption of disclosure toothless and robs FOIL requesters of meaningful
judicial review of agency denials. Part I of this Note provides an overview
of New York’s FOIL and the federal FOIA, FOIL’s legislative history, and
how New York state courts, federal courts, and other state courts interpret an
agency’s burden to demonstrate that it performed an adequate records search.
Part II outlines the basic arguments surrounding the Rattley standard and
compares New York state and federal cases to demonstrate the way in which
Rattley lessens the burden for agencies and places a heavier burden on
requesters challenging a denial in New York state court. Finally, Part III
proposes that New York state courts replace the twenty-year-old Rattley
standard with the federal reasonableness standard, and otherwise urges the
New York state legislature to adopt a statutory fix that resolves FOIL’s
ambiguity regarding the diligent search certification requirement.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF FOIL, THE RATTLEY STANDARD, AND FOIA’S
INFLUENCE ON NEW YORK AND OTHER STATE SUNSHINE LAWS
The New York FOIL and the federal FOIA share analogous legislative
purposes and statutory constructions, yet their divergence in how much
scrutiny is cast on an agency’s diligent search certification illuminates the
Rattley decision’s impact on freedom of information in New York. To this
end, Part I.A outlines FOIL’s legislative history, how FOIL works—
describing both administrative and constructive denials, as well as
subsequent administrative and judicial appeals—and summarizes the diligent
search jurisprudence leading up to Rattley. Part I.B then describes how the
federal FOIA functions and lays out the federal courts’ reasonableness test to
evaluate the adequacy of an agency’s search. Finally, Part I.C discusses the
instructive nature of FOIA case law in New York state courts and how other
states have adopted the federal courts’ reasonableness test to assess an
agency’s search in their own state court systems.
A. An Overview of New York State’s Freedom of Information Law
FOIL’s legislative history highlights the statute’s underlying presumption
of disclosure and FOIL’s structure mirroring the federal FOIA.

41. See infra Part II.B.2; see also infra note 291.
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1. FOIL’s Enactment and Subsequent Amendment: An Attempt to More
Closely Align FOIL with FOIA
New York governor Malcolm Wilson signed FOIL into law in 1974.42
FOIL’s original legislative declaration emphasized that the public’s
knowledge of both government actions and the information underlying those
actions is essential for any free democratic society, and it affirmed that
government secrecy should not overshadow the people’s right to know.43
New York state courts have also emphasized the statute’s purpose of
promoting public access to information, increasing the citizenry’s knowledge
and understanding of official state activity, and preventing governmental
secrecy.44 FOIL’s sponsor in the senate, Ralph J. Marino, noted that the New
York FOIL was derived from the federal FOIA and received widespread
support by the state legislature and the media at the time of passage.45
In 1977, the New York legislature amended FOIL.46 The 1974 version of
FOIL recognized only eight categories of records that agencies were
obligated to release for public inspection, creating the presumption that all
documents outside of these eight categories were unavailable to the public.47
The primary thrust of the 1977 amendment was reversal of this basic
premise.48 The amended statute instead specified the categories of records
that an agency49 could withhold, creating a presumption of disclosing “all
records” to the public unless a record falls within an enumerated
exemption.50 In addition to codifying a presumption of disclosure, the
42. See Freedom of Information Law, ch. 578, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1538 (codified at N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 85–89 (McKinney 1974) (current version at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90
(McKinney 2022))).
43. See id. at 1538 (“[A] free society is maintained . . . when the public is aware of
government actions . . . . The people’s right to know the process of governmental
decision-making and the documents and statistics leading to determinations is basic to our
society. Access to such information should not be thwarted by shrouding it with the cloak of
secrecy or confidentiality.”).
44. See, e.g., Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Signor, 842 N.E.2d 466, 469 (N.Y.
2005).
45. See Marino, supra note 21, at 83 (noting that FOIL was “[p]atterned after the Federal
Freedom of Information Act”); Memorandum from Ralph J. Marino, Sen. (1977), reprinted
in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL—1977, at 330–31 (1977) (“Basically, this
legislation will conform New York State’s version of Freedom of Information to the Federal
law [FOIA].”); see also Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 466 n.1 (N.Y. 1979) (“The
legislative history of the Freedom of Information Law indicates that many of its provisions . . .
were patterned after the Federal analogue.”).
46. See Freedom of Information Law, ch. 933, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1 (codified as amended at
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (McKinney 2022)).
47. See ch. 578, 1974 N.Y. Laws at 1539–40.
48. Compare id., with ch. 933, 1977 N.Y. Laws at 2 (mandating that agencies make “all
records” available except for those specifically exempted).
49. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 86 (McKinney 2022) (defining “[a]gency” as “any state or
municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority,
public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or
proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the
judiciary or the state legislature”).
50. See id. § 87(2); see also Memorandum from Ralph J. Marino, supra note 45 (“All
records are now closed but for nine exceptions and this legislation literally reverses that basic
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amendment placed the burden of proof on the agency denying a FOIL request
to justify its nondisclosure in a judicial proceeding challenging the denial.51
Supporters of the amendment contended that placing the burden on the
agency to justify nondisclosure was consistent with FOIL’s legislative
intent52 and was equitable given that the everyday citizen requesting records
is inherently less familiar with the records than the government agency
maintaining them.53 Although FOIL has undergone several amendments
since 1977,54 the 1977 FOIL remains substantially intact.55
Additionally, FOIL establishes the Committee on Open Government56
(COOG), a committee that oversees the administration of FOIL and advises
both the public and state government officials on the intricacies of FOIL.57
FOIL enables the COOG to provide advisory opinions to agencies58 and the
premise.”). FOIL also dictates that agencies proactively disclose certain information without
the need for anyone to file a FOIL request, including rules and regulations regarding the
availability of records and how to obtain them, voting records at agency proceedings, and a
reasonably detailed list of all records in the agency’s possession that must be posted on the
agency’s website. See PUB. OFF. § 87.
51. See Press Release, Mario M. Cuomo, Sec’y of State, N.Y. Dep’t of State (Jul. 27,
1977), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1977, ch. 933, at 4 (urging the governor to sign the FOIL
amendment and noting that the amendments place the burden of proof on the agency that
denied access to records to demonstrate FOIL compliance in a judicial proceeding); see also
Budget Report on Bills, No. S. 16-A, at 2 (N.Y. 1977), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1977, ch.
933, at 15, 16 (“By placing the burden of proof on public agencies to demonstrate that access
to records has been legally denied, this bill strengthens the case of private citizens in Article
78 proceedings and may encourage increased agency compliance with the FOIL.”).
52. See Memorandum from John C. Esposito, Couns., N.Y. State Consumer Prot. Bd., to
Judah Gribetz, Couns., Off. of the Governor (Jul. 22, 1977), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket
1977, ch. 933, at 106 (arguing that placing the burden of proof on the requester is inconsistent
with FOIL’s legislative intent and that the presumption should be for access and against
denial).
53. See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Dryfoos, Couns., Off. of the Lieutenant Governor, to
Judah Gribetz, Couns., Off. of the Governor, at 3 (Jul. 25, 1977), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket
1977, ch. 933, at 65, 67 (indicating the lieutenant governor’s support for the 1977 FOIL
amendment reversing a presumption of denial to a presumption of disclosure and noting that
the current procedure “dramatically favors the responding agency” because the requester is
“generally ill-equipped” to submit an adequate FOIL request, while the agency can base its
arguments on “intimate knowledge of the document[s]”).
54. See Act of May 3, 1982, ch. 73, 1982 N.Y. Laws 1383 (codified as amended at PUB.
OFF. §§ 87(1), 89(2) (McKinney 2022)) (granting attorneys’ fees in certain situations to FOIL
requesters); Act of July 24, 1989, ch. 705, 1989 N.Y. Laws 3160 (codified as amended at PUB.
OFF. § 89(2) (McKinney 2022)) (banning the willful concealment or destruction of records to
prevent public inspection); Act of Aug. 16, 2006, ch. 492, 2006 N.Y. Laws 3375 (codified as
amended at PUB. OFF. § 89(1) (McKinney 2022)) (requiring agencies to respond to FOIL
requests over email and granting courts discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the substantially
prevailing party).
55. See Michael J. Grygiel, New York Open Government Guide: Foreword, REPS. COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/new-york/#opengovernment-guide [https://perma.cc/EHL4-W8PZ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
56. See PUB. OFF. §§ 87(1)(a)–(b), 89(1)–(2). The New York State administrative code
contains rules and regulations promulgated by COOG. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
21, § 1401 (2021).
57. See PUB. OFF. § 89(1)(b); Committee on Open Government: Overview, N.Y. STATE,
https://opengovernment.ny.gov [https://perma.cc/8AG7-P4CD] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
58. See PUB. OFF. § 89(1)(b)(i).
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public59 regarding FOIL, to promulgate rules and regulations regarding
procedures for making records availabile,60 to develop a records request form
for citizens,61 and to report annually to the legislature with findings regarding
FOIL’s administration and suggested amendments to the statute.62 While
COOG advisory opinions can clarify FOIL discrepancies for agencies or
members of the public,63 they are not binding and do not warrant greater
deference than an agency’s own interpretation in a court proceeding.64
The COOG promulgates rules and regulations with the force of law,65 and
FOIL requires agencies to conform their record-availability procedures with
COOG rules,66 but the COOG has not clarified how an agency must certify
a diligent search beyond what is required under New York State case law.67
Under COOG regulations, an agency must designate one or more individuals
as records access officers (RAOs) responsible for coordinating the agency’s
response to a FOIL request.68 Therefore, when an agency cannot locate
requested documents, the RAO is responsible for certifying that the agency
does not keep the requested records69 or that a diligent search failed to
uncover the records.70 Nevertheless, the courts, and not COOG, have the
final say on how agencies must certify a diligent search.71
2. Administrative and Constructive Denials Under FOIL
In addition to promoting broad access to agency documents, FOIL outlines
the proper procedures for an agency to deny a FOIL request through either
administrative or constructive denial.72 An agency’s response to a FOIL
request falls into one of three general buckets. The agency can (1) disclose
the requested record, (2) administratively deny the request pursuant to a
59. See id. § 89(1)(b)(ii).
60. See id. § 89(1)(b)(iii).
61. See id. § 89(1)(b)(v).
62. See id. § 89(1)(b)(vi).
63. See id. § 89(1)(b)(i)–(ii).
64. See Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enter. Dev. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 277, 279–80 (N.Y.
1994) (citing In re John P. v. Whalen, 429 N.E.2d 117, 121 (N.Y. 1981)); see also Comm. on
Open Gov’t, N.Y. State Dep’t of State, Advisory Opinion 17434 (Nov. 18, 2008),
https://docsopengovernment.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f17434.html
[https://perma.cc/D6XQMXGJ] (“[T]he Committee on Open Government . . . is not empowered to issue a binding
decision.”).
65. See Comm. on Open Gov’t, supra note 64.
66. See PUB. OFF. § 87(1)(a)–(b).
67. See Comm. on Open Gov’t, supra note 64 (directing the requester to New York state
court holdings for an explanation of FOIL’s requirement that an agency certify a diligent
search).
68. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1401.2(a) (2021).
69. See id. § 1401.2(b)(7)(i).
70. See id. § 1401.2(b)(7)(ii).
71. See Comm. on Open Gov’t, supra note 64.
72. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 87, 89 (McKinney 2022). This Note’s Introduction
provides examples of administrative denial (the NYPD informing the incarcerated individual
that it could not locate documents after diligent search) and constructive denial (the DOH
failing to respond to the public policy center’s request in a reasonable amount of time). See
supra notes 4, 13 and accompanying text.
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specific exemption, or (3) administratively deny the request because the
document either does not exist or cannot be located.73 Under the second
response, New York Public Officers Law section 87(2) enumerates nine
categories of agency records that are exempt from disclosure for various
compelling privacy, safety, and confidentiality interests.74 If a citizen
requests a record within one of these nine categories of documents, the
agency can properly deny the FOIL request even if it possesses the
document.75
If a document is not exempted from disclosure under section 87(2), under
the third type of response—that the document does not exist or cannot be
located—the agency has several remaining options for properly denying the
request. New York Public Officers Law section 89 provides the agency with
the remaining procedurally proper grounds for denial: (1) that the request
was not reasonably described,76 (2) that the agency does not possess the
requested record,77 or (3) that the requested record could not be located after
a diligent search.78 This Note focuses on the third ground for denial: that an
agency could not locate the document following a diligent search.
In addition to the “administrative” denials outlined above, an agency’s
failure to meet the response deadlines outlined in section 89(3) will also
constitute a “constructive” denial of a records request.79 Section 89(3)
73. See PUB. OFF. §§ 87(2), 89(3); see also Goyer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t
Conservation, 813 N.Y.S.2d 628, 634 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
74. See PUB. OFF. § 87(2)(a)–(i). FOIL exempts from disclosure records that (1) are
exempted by another state or federal statute, (2) would constitute an unjustified invasion of
privacy, (3) would impede contract or collective bargaining negotiations, (4) constitute trade
secrets, (5) would interfere with law enforcement, (6) could imperil a person’s life or safety,
(7) are interagency or intra-agency materials, (8) are examination questions or answers prior
to final determination of questions, or (9) would hinder ability to protect information
technology assets. See id.
75. See id. § 87(2).
76. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a) (“Each entity subject to the provisions of this article, within
five business days of the receipt of a written request for a record reasonably described, shall
make such record available to the person requesting it . . . .”); Konigsberg v. Coughlin, 501
N.E.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that FOIL requirement that request “reasonably
describe” record sought enables agency to locate document in question (quoting PUB. OFF.
§ 89(3)(a))).
77. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a) (“[T]he entity shall provide a copy of such record . . . or . . .
shall certify that it does not have possession of such record . . . .”).
78. See id. (“[T]he entity shall provide a copy of such record . . . or . . . shall certify . . .
that such record cannot be found after diligent search.”).
79. See id. § 89(4)(a) (“Failure by an agency to conform to the provisions of subdivision
three of this section shall constitute a denial.”); see also Legal Aid Soc’y v. N.Y. State Dep’t
of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 962 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013) (classifying
an agency’s failure to respond to a FOIL request or appeal within the statute’s specified
timeline as a “constructive denial”); Comm. on Open Gov’t, N.Y. State Dep’t of State,
Advisory Opinion 14913 (Sep. 24, 2004), https://docsopengovernment.dos.ny.gov/
coog/ftext/f14913.htm [https://perma.cc/XZR4-M4VQ] (“If neither a response to a request
nor an acknowledgement of the receipt of a request is given within five business days, if . . .
an agency delays responding for an unreasonable time after it acknowledges that a request has
been received, or if the acknowledgement of the receipt of a request fails to include an
estimated date for granting or denying access, a request may . . . be considered to have been
constructively denied.”).
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imposes deadlines on agencies to respond to FOIL requests.80 When an
agency receives a “reasonably described”81 records request, the agency must
respond within five days of receipt.82 In this initial response, the agency must
either make the requested record available, deny the request in writing, or
acknowledge the request and provide a reasonable approximate date for when
the agency will grant or deny the request.83 If an agency decides to grant a
request, but circumstances prevent disclosure within twenty days from
acknowledgment, the agency shall inform the requester of the reason why it
cannot complete the request within twenty days and provide a reasonable
date for when the agency will grant the request.84 In the final response, the
agency must either provide the requested document, or certify that it does not
possess the record or that “such record cannot be found after diligent
search.”85
The COOG regulations on FOIL responses crystallize that an agency’s
failure to comply with section 89(3)’s time limitations constitutes a
constructive denial, and they outline seven examples.86 The COOG
regulations mirror section 89(4)(a)’s language explicitly stating that an
agency’s failure to follow the section 89(3) timeline will constitute a denial.87
Thus, not only can an agency administratively deny a FOIL request because
the document is exempted88 or because the document cannot be located after
a diligent search,89 but an agency can also constructively deny a FOIL request
by failing to make timely or reasonable responses.90

80. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a), (4)(a).
81. Id. § 89(3)(a).
82. See id.
83. See id. An agency cannot deny a FOIL request because the request is “voluminous”
or because “locating or reviewing the requested records or providing the requested copies is
burdensome.” Id.
84. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a); see also Data Tree v. Romaine, 880 N.E.2d 10, 17 (N.Y.
2007) (establishing that there is “no specific time period in which the agency must grant access
to the records” and that a reasonable amount of time needed to respond depends on several
factors including the size of the request and the necessary methods for retrieving documents).
85. Id.
86. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1401.5(e)(1)–(7) (2021). The COOG
provides the following examples of constructive denials that warrant appeal: (1) failure to
either grant or deny access in writing, or to acknowledge receipt of the FOIL request within
five business days; (2) failure to provide an approximate response date; (3) giving an
unreasonable approximate response date; (4) failure to respond within a reasonable time after
the approximate response date or within twenty business days after acknowledging receipt;
(5) communicating that a request will be granted within twenty business days but then failing
to grant the request, unless the agency provides a new response and explains the delay;
(6) failure to explain why the request was not granted or provide new response date within
twenty business days; or (7) responding that more time is needed to respond but providing an
unreasonable response date. See id.
87. See PUB. OFF. § 89(4)(a).
88. See id. § 87(2).
89. See id. § 89(3)(a).
90. See id. § 89(4)(a); see also tit. 21, § 1401.5(e)(1)–(7).
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3. Challenging a FOIL Denial Through an Article 78 Proceeding
FOIL provides a mechanism for requesters to file an administrative appeal
of either an administrative or constructive denial, and also to challenge that
denial in court following the administrative appeal.91 A citizen whose FOIL
request is denied may file their administrative appeal in writing to the agency
within thirty days of the denial.92 In response to the administrative appeal,
the agency must, within ten days, either provide access to the requested
records or “fully explain” the reason for sustaining the denial.93 If the agency
denies the administrative appeal or does not make a timely response, the
requester can then bring a proceeding under article 78 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) (“Article 78”) for court review of the
agency’s final action.94 A requester can only bring an Article 78 proceeding
if the agency’s denial is final, and only after bringing an administrative
appeal.95
An Article 78 proceeding challenging an agency’s FOIL denial takes the
form of a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel disclosure96 and acts as
an official command to an officer or agency to perform a duty enjoined on
them by law.97 In the context of FOIL, the petitioner in an Article 78
proceeding seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the agency to comply with
91. See PUB. OFF. § 89(4)(b).
92. See id. § 89(4)(a).
93. See id. FOIL does not define the phrase “fully explain,” and an agency’s failure to
provide reasons for the denial at the administrative appeal level does not bar the agency from
raising different reasons for denial. See William Tesler, Gould Debunked: The Prohibition
Against Using New York’s Freedom of Information Law as a Criminal Discovery Tool, 44
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 71, 82–85 (2000) (explaining that FOIL’s language prompting agencies
to “fully explain” the denial is “merely directory”).
94. See PUB. OFF. § 89(4)(b). The date of either the letter denying the administrative
appeal or the constructive denial of the appeal (if the agency does not respond within ten days)
triggers a four-month statute of limitations period for the requester to bring an Article 78
proceeding. See Tesler, supra note 93, at 81.
95. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 2022); see also PUB. OFF. § 89(4)(b) (“[A] person
denied access to a record in an appeal determination . . . may bring a proceeding for review of
such denial pursuant to article seventy-eight.”).
96. See C.P.L.R. 7801; see, e.g., Scott, Sardano & Pomeranz v. Recs. Access Officer of
Syracuse, 480 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (N.Y. 1985) (“[P]etitioner brought an article 78 proceeding
in the nature of mandamus to compel access to the reports pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Law.”); Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001) (“[T]his
CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel disclosure was properly dismissed as moot.”).
97. See C.P.L.R. 7801, 7801 cmt. 3, 7803; Hamptons Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Moore,
417 N.E.2d 533, 537 (N.Y. 1981) (“An article 78 proceeding may lie . . . by way of mandamus
to compel performance by an administrative agency of a duty enjoined by law.”). CPLR. 7803
outlines the only four questions that can be raised in an Article 78 proceeding: (1) whether
the agency failed to perform a statutory duty; (2) whether the agency acted outside its
jurisdiction; (3) whether a final determination violated “lawful procedure, was affected by an
error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion”; or (4) whether a final
determination following a hearing is supported by substantial evidence on the record. C.P.L.R.
7803. Commentary notes that the first question in CPLR 7803 “corresponds with the writ of
mandamus to compel,” and that courts rarely mention the error-of-law standard specifically.
See id. 7803 cmt. 1. Instead, the error-of-law question is implicit in the allegation that the
agency improperly interpreted or incorrectly applied a statute. See id.
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FOIL, and to produce the requested documents that were improperly denied98
or to certify that it performed a diligent search yielding no documents.99 An
Article 78 proceeding can also determine whether an agency action resulted
from an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious, or constituted an abuse of
discretion.100 Courts apply the error-of-law standard in FOIL cases,101 as the
analysis rests on whether a document properly falls within a specific
exemption102 or whether an agency properly interpreted and performed their
statutory obligation to diligently search for documents.103 Article 78 FOIL
cases seldom mention the error-of-law standard directly, but New York state
courts use the error-of-law standard to determine whether an agency correctly
interpreted their statutory duty under FOIL, and therefore whether it correctly
denied a FOIL request.104
4. New York State Jurisprudence Evaluating Diligent Search Certifications
in Article 78 Proceedings
Under FOIL, requesters can bring an Article 78 proceeding to challenge
any final denial of their records request, including a denial based on a
specified exemption under section 87(2) or a denial based on a diligent search
failing to uncover the requested records under section 89(3).105 When an
agency denies a FOIL request under section 87(2), the agency bears the
burden of proof to demonstrate that an enumerated exception applies.106 In
such proceedings, the New York Court of Appeals “narrowly construe[s]”
section 87(2) exemptions.107 The agency must “articulate ‘particularized and
specific justification’ for not disclosing requested documents.”108 By
narrowly construing section 87(2) exemptions, the Court of Appeals
emphasizes that blanket exemptions protecting documents from disclosure
98. See, e.g., Goyer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, 813 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630
(Sup. Ct. 2005) (“In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner Jacqueline Goyer seeks a
judgment compelling respondents . . . to comply with her Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
request . . . by providing her with the public information she sought . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Jackson v. Albany Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 113 N.Y.S.3d 313, 314 (App.
Div. 3d Dep’t 2019) (“[P]etitioner eventually commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding
seeking to compel respondent to produce the photographs.”).
100. See C.P.L.R. 7803; supra note 97.
101. See, e.g., Surveillance Tech. Oversight Project v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No.
156442/2021, 2021 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6780, at *7 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 2021).
102. See, e.g., Hanig v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 588 N.E.2d 750, 753 (N.Y.
1992) (clarifying that the question in Article 78 proceeding to challenge whether document
was exempted from disclosure under section 87(2) was “solely one of statutory
interpretation”).
103. See supra note 97.
104. See supra notes 97–98, 102.
105. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(4).
106. See id. § 89(4)(b) (“In the event that access to any record is denied pursuant to the
provisions of subdivision two of section eighty-seven of this article, the agency involved shall
have the burden of proving that such record falls within the provisions of such subdivision
two.”); see also Hanig, 588 N.E.2d at 752–53.
107. Hanig, 588 N.E.2d at 752–53.
108. Gould v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 811 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Fink v.
Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 1979)).
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are contrary to FOIL’s purpose of open government.109 While FOIL does
not expand on its command for agencies to “fully explain” the reasons for
denial at the administrative appeal level,110 the Court of Appeals clarifies that
an agency denying a FOIL request pursuant to a section 87(2) exemption
must explicitly justify why a certain record falls within that exemption to
meet their burden of proof in an Article 78 proceeding.111
While an agency must demonstrate a “particularized and specific
justification” that a requested document falls within a section 87(2)
exemption to meet its burden of proof,112 New York state courts do not
require the agency to show the same explicit justification to certify that it
performed a diligent search justifying its section 89(3) denial.113 FOIL does
not specify how any agency must “certify” that a “diligent” search was
performed to properly deny a FOIL request because the agency could not
locate the document.114 The New York Court of Appeals weighed in on this
ambiguity in Rattley, holding that an agency can meet its burden of proof
with a simple statement that it performed a diligent search, and without
describing the search or providing a statement from the person who
conducted the search.115
In Rattley, the court heard an appeal of a decision from the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department. The
First Department held that in responding to a FOIL request, a letter from
NYPD’s counsel stating that a “thorough and diligent” search had been
performed was insufficient to certify a diligent search because the letter
lacked detail or personal knowledge of the alleged search.116 The First
Department relied on Key v. Hynes,117 a case from the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, holding
that a conclusory statement averring that a diligent search produced no
documents was insufficient for an agency to satisfy their FOIL obligation,
especially when the person who made the statement lacked direct knowledge
of the search.118 The First Department emphasized that conclusory
statements lacking any evidentiary proof cannot justify a denial by diligent

109. See id.
110. See PUB. OFF. § 89(4)(a).
111. See id. § 89(4)(b); Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 1979).
112. See Fink, 393 N.E.2d at 465.
113. See, e.g., Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001).
114. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3); Rattley, 756 N.E.2d at 58.
115. 756 N.E.2d at 58.
116. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 706 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000),
rev’d, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
117. 613 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994), invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police
Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
118. See id. at 928; see also Thomas v. Recs. Access Officer, 613 N.Y.S.2d 929, 929 (App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 1994) (holding that agency satisfied FOIL certification requirement with
affidavit from employee who performed the search for documents and subsequent evidence
demonstrating diligent search at hearing), invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756
N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
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search under section 89(3), just as similar conclusory statements cannot
support a denial by specified exemption under section 87(2).119
The New York Court of Appeals in Rattley reversed the First Department’s
decision and overturned Hynes,120 holding that an agency can meet its burden
of proof—that it complied with section 89(3) and performed a diligent
search—with a conclusory statement lacking detail or personal knowledge of
the search.121 In this case, the NYPD satisfied its burden of proof with an
affirmation that “despite a ‘thorough and diligent search,’ certain documents
could not be found.”122
When an agency meets its burden to certify that a diligent search failed to
uncover the requested documents, the requester can nevertheless secure a
hearing on the issue of whether the documents exist if they can “articulate a
demonstrable factual basis to support [the] contention that the requested
documents existed and were within the [agency’s] control.”123 Under this
high standard,124 a petitioner armed only with conclusory speculation and
lacking factual support for the existence of the requested records or proof that
the agency failed to search for the documents will not be able to overcome
the agency’s certification and will face final denial of their appeal.125
B. FOIL’s Precursor: The Federal Freedom of Information Act
New York’s Freedom of Information Law is modeled directly after the
federal Freedom of Information Act.126 This section provides an overview
of how the federal FOIA works, how federal courts assess the adequacy of a
federal agency’s search for records when a requester challenges a FOIA
denial, and how federal agencies can meet their burden of proof in court to
demonstrate that they performed a sufficient search for documents.
119. See Rattley, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 27; Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 928 (arguing that there is no
basis in law or reason to accept conclusory statements to meet the agency’s burden of proof
to certify a diligent search under section 89(3), but not to justify an exemption under
section 87(2) in an Article 78 proceeding).
120. See Rattley, 756 N.E.2d at 58.
121. See id. (“Neither a detailed description of the search nor a personal statement from the
person who actually conducted the search is required. Here, the Department satisfied the
certification requirement by averring that all responsive documents had been disclosed and
that it had conducted a diligent search for the documents it could not locate.”).
122. Id. at 57 (quoting affirmation submitted by the NYPD).
123. Gould v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (N.Y. 1996).
124. See Tesler, supra note 93, at 88 n.74 (citing Gould v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d
808, 814 (N.Y. 1996)) (noting that the demonstrable-factual-basis standard is “formidable”
and providing several examples of proffered evidence that failed to meet the standard,
including when newspaper articles referred to the requested documents and agency’s own
documents referred to the requested records).
125. See Gould, 675 N.E.2d at 814 (finding that petitioner’s “conjecture” that documents
existed years beforehand is “insufficient to warrant a hearing”); Jackson v. Albany Cnty. Dist.
Att’y’s Off., 113 N.Y.S.3d 313, 314–15 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2019) (finding that police
property report listing roll of film did not establish “demonstrable factual basis” that police
possessed negatives of crime scene photographs requested by petitioner); DeFreitas v. N.Y.
State Police Crime Lab, 35 N.Y.S.3d 598, 600 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2016) (finding that
petitioner “failed to support his speculation that such documentation exists” to earn a hearing).
126. See supra note 45.
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1. An Overview of FOIA and Federal Agencies’ Search Obligations
The federal government established a statutory right of public access to
federal agency documents with the enactment of FOIA in 1966.127 The U.S.
Supreme Court recognizes FOIA’s significance as a tool for citizens to know
“what their Government is up to”128 and as a necessary check on any
potential corruption.129 Like with FOIL, FOIA’s mandate that federal
agencies subject to the act make all records available to the public—unless
the requested records fall within a specific exemption—creates a
presumption of broad disclosure.130 FOIA has undergone numerous
amendments since its enactment, including amendments first narrowing and
then broadening the scope of law enforcement and national security
exemptions, amendments addressing proactive disclosure of electronic
records, and amendments preventing foreign governments or international
organizations from submitting FOIA requests.131
Like New York’s FOIL, the federal FOIA contains requirements for
proactive disclosure of certain documents to the public without the need for
a formal FOIA request.132 Furthermore, FOIA outlines nine categories of
documents that are exempt from disclosure in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).133 Section
552(c) clarifies that certain law enforcement records—those concerning
ongoing criminal investigations,134 identification of informants,135 and
foreign intelligence or counterterrorism efforts136—are not subject to FOIA’s
127. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552).
128. See, e.g., Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171–72 (2004)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773
(1989)).
129. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
130. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (4)(B), (b), (c); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493
U.S. 146, 153 (1989); Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
131. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: INTRODUCTION 7–9 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/
1248371/download [https://perma.cc/72AJ-J33A]; see also Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency
With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
79, 80–91 (2012) (providing further exploration of FOIA’s history and amendments).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(2). FOIA requires agencies to proactively publish certain
materials in the Federal Register—including descriptions of agency organization and methods
of obtaining information from agencies—in addition to publishing certain materials online—
including final opinions and orders from adjudications, agency policy statements, and certain
administrative staff manuals. See id.
133. See id. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The nine categories of documents exempt from disclosure are
(1) documents classified as secret by executive order to protect national defense or foreign
policy interests, (2) documents only related to an agency’s internal rules and practices,
(3) documents specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute, (4) documents
containing trade secrets and privileged or confidential commercial or financial information,
(5) interagency or intra-agency memoranda, (6) personnel and medical files that would
constitute an invasion of privacy if disclosed, (7) certain law enforcement records,
(8) documents regarding an agency’s examination of a financial institution, and (9) geological
and geophysical information regarding wells. See id.
134. See id. § 552(c)(1)(A)–(B).
135. See id. § 552(c)(2).
136. See id. § 552(c)(3).
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disclosure requirements.137 FOIA also establishes the Office of Government
Information Services within the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration.138
FOIA grants the public the right to request documents that are not
specifically exempted.139 If a request is reasonably described,140 the agency
must provide the requested records unless they are exempt from disclosure
pursuant to the nine specified exemptions in § 552(b)141 or are otherwise
excluded from FOIA disclosure under § 552(c).142 Like FOIL exemptions,
FOIA exemptions are “narrowly construe[d]”143 by federal courts and are
mostly discretionary.144 Unlike FOIL, FOIA does not contain language
directing the agency to conduct a “diligent” search, but the statute provides a
definition of “search”—“to review, manually or by automated means, agency
records for the purpose of locating those records which are responsive to a
request.”145 Finally, FOIA provides an avenue for an administrative appeal
of a denial,146 and a requester who has exhausted the administrative appeals
process may seek judicial review of the agency’s denial in federal district
court.147
2. A Reasonableness Test: Federal Jurisprudence Evaluating the Adequacy
of Agency Searches Under FOIA
While federal courts require agencies subject to FOIA to narrowly
construe FOIA exemptions, federal courts examine the adequacy of an
agency’s search for records, and agency certifications of the search
performed, under a different standard than do New York state courts. Since
1983, the D.C. Circuit has held that agencies must conduct a search that is
137. See id. § 552(c).
138. See id. § 552(h)(1). The Office of Government Information Services reviews FOIA
agency policies and procedures, monitors agencies’ compliance with FOIA, offers mediation
services as an alternative to litigation, and reports annually any legislative recommendations
for FOIA. See id. § 552(h)(2)–(4).
139. See id. § 552(a)(3).
140. See id. § 552(a)(3)(A).
141. See id. § 552(b).
142. See id. § 552(c).
143. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001)
(quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982)). Furthermore, if a federal agency
withholds a record under an exemption, it can only withhold the information to which the
exemption applies and must provide all “reasonably segregable” portions of the record. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
144. See Bartholdi Cable Co. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“FOIA’s
exemptions simply permit, but do not require, an agency to withhold exempted information.”).
145. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE
TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 42–43 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/1199421/download [https://perma.cc/X6KF-2BEV].
146. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
147. See id. § 552(a)(4)(B). Most FOIA case law comes from the D.C. Circuit because,
under FOIA, the D.C. Circuit is a proper venue for all FOIA litigation. See id. (venue for
judicial review of FOIA denial is proper in district where requester resides, where records are,
or in D.C. Circuit); Cox, supra note 19, at 392 n.24 (noting that, in 2008, 40 percent of all
FOIA cases were filed in the D.C. Circuit).
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“reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents” to fulfill their
FOIA search obligation.148 When a FOIA requester challenges the adequacy
of the agency’s search for documents after receiving a denial, the agency
must demonstrate that it made a “good faith effort to conduct a search for the
requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to
produce the information requested.”149 The agency bears the burden at
summary judgment to show that it complied with FOIA’s search
requirement150 and can rely on a “reasonably detailed affidavit”—including
at least the search terms used and the type of search performed—to certify
the adequacy of its search.151 Federal courts maintain that an agency’s
affidavit averring to the search’s adequacy must be “relatively detailed and
nonconclusory and submitted in good faith.”152 A declaration that outlines
all the files reasonably believed to contain the requested records, the actual
files searched, and the search terms used can satisfy this requirement.153
Finally, federal courts do not require an affidavit from the person who
actually performed the search and accept an affidavit from the person
responsible for coordinating the search.154
148. Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325–26 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Because the
D.C. Circuit hears most FOIA litigation, this Note refers to the standard articulated in the D.C.
Circuit as “the federal standard.” See supra note 147. Notably, most circuits have adopted the
reasonableness test articulated by the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Thomas v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 551
F. App’x 24, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2014); Campbell v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 46 F. App’x 477, 480 (3d
Cir. 2011); Trentadue v. FBI, 572 F.3d 794, 797–98 (10th Cir. 2009); Urban v. United States,
72 F.3d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1995); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 559–60 (1st Cir. 1993).
149. Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 325–26 (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army,
920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Courts examine the search itself—as opposed to the results
of the search or the remote possibility of responsive documents existing—to measure the
adequacy of the search. See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. CV 15-687, 2021 WL
3363423, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2021); Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 745 F.2d 1476, 1485
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
150. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (“In such a case [where documents are improperly
withheld] the court shall determine the matter de novo . . . and the burden is on the agency to
sustain its action.”).
151. See Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326 (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army,
920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Kowalczyk v. Dep’t of Just., 73 F.3d 386, 388
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
152. Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting
Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
153. See Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that courts may rely
on reasonably detailed affidavits asserting that “all files likely to contain responsive materials
(if such records exist) were searched” to find that an agency has met their burden of proof for
an adequate search (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1990)); Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 313–14 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(explaining that an affidavit containing the search terms, type of search performed, and
averment that all files likely to contain responsive records were searched is adequate); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
LITIGATION CONSIDERATIONS 53–57 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/1205066/
download [https://perma.cc/N3DC-QAXU].
154. See Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 19 F.3d 807, 814 (2d Cir. 1994) (“An affidavit from
an agency employee responsible for supervising a FOIA search is all that is needed . . . there
is no need for the agency to supply affidavits from each individual who participated in the
actual search.”); DiBacco v. Dep’t of Army, 926 F.3d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (accepting
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When evaluating the adequacy of an agency’s search, federal courts
maintain a standard of reasonableness that balances FOIA’s broad
presumption of disclosure with realistic expectations for federal agencies’
search efforts.155 Under this standard, an agency need not show that it
located every single document a person requested under FOIA to meet its
burden, and the adequacy of the search is determined “not by the fruits of the
search, but by the appropriateness of [its] methods.”156 The federal standard
underscores that adequacy—not perfection—is the standard to measure an
agency’s search,157 and once the agency has met its initial burden of
demonstrating the search’s adequacy,158 the requester can only overcome the
agency’s assertion with a showing of bad faith.159 Although federal courts
measure an agency’s efforts under a standard of reasonableness,160 they still
require agencies to provide a reasonably detailed affidavit on appeal161 to
meet the burden at summary judgment and to maintain FOIA’s presumption
of disclosure.162
C. FOIA’s Influence on FOIL and Sunshine Laws in Other States
Given the similarities between FOIL and FOIA, New York state courts
treat FOIA case law as instructive in FOIL litigation.163 Additionally, FOIA
case law not only informs New York’s sunshine law jurisprudence; various
other states also adopt the federal reasonableness test to determine whether
declaration of supervisor who described search efforts based in part on information she
received from employees); SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (finding that person coordinating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s
search efforts was appropriate person to provide comprehensive affidavit even though some
information was secondhand).
155. See, e.g., Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
156. Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 315; see also Mobley, 806 F.3d at 581 (finding that an agency
search that does not find all relevant material is not necessarily inadequate); Amnesty Int’l
USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d. 479, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that the discovery of two
additional documents did not render the search inadequate because the documents were
located in a place that the CIA determined would likely not contain documents).
157. See DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
158. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Kean v. NASA, 480 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“The burden of proof is on the government to show that its search was reasonably
calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”).
159. See Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 560 (1st Cir. 1993). Once the agency has supplied
a proper affidavit outlining the search, that agency affidavit is afforded a presumption of good
faith. See Carney, 19 F.3d at 812 (“Affidavits submitted by an agency are ‘accorded a
presumption of good faith’ . . . .” (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200
(D.C. Cir. 1991)). But see Am. Oversight v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, No. 18-cv-2424, 2020
WL 1536186, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (noting that while requester cannot dictate search
terms to the agency, if requester suggests demonstrably reasonable search terms, then the
agency must still explain why the search terms were not used).
160. See Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485.
161. See Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 313–14.
162. See Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The court
applies a ‘reasonableness’ test to determine the ‘adequacy’ of a search methodology,
consistent with congressional intent tilting the scale in favor of disclosure.” (quoting Weisberg
v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
163. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text; Part I.C.1.
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their agencies have performed an adequate search for requested records.164
This section highlights the instructive nature of FOIA case law in FOIL
litigation, and points to several states that have mirrored their adequate search
analysis after the federal standard.
1. Federal FOIA Case Law Is Instructive in New York FOIL Cases
New York legislators specifically patterned the 1977 FOIL after the
federal FOIA,165 and New York courts consider federal FOIA case law when
interpreting FOIL’s language.166 In 1979, the New York Court of Appeals
found that “[f]ederal case law and legislative history . . . are instructive”
when analyzing the scope of a FOIL exemption.167 As recently as 2018, the
Court of Appeals continues to recognize the instructive nature of federal
FOIA case law when interpreting FOIL.168 The Court of Appeals’s adoption
of FOIA case law tracks New York statutory law directing courts to borrow
from federal decisions when construing similar state statutes that are
ambiguous.169
2. Other States Have Adopted the Federal Reasonableness Test to
Determine the Adequacy of an Agency’s Search for Documents
New York is not the only state to adopt a sunshine law modeled after
FOIA. Every state legislature has enacted its own freedom of information
law “in some form or another.”170 In addition, several states joined New
York in patterning their sunshine laws directly after the federal statute,

164. See infra Part I.C.2.
165. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
166. See Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. 1979) (citing federal courts’
interpretations of FOIA); see also Tesler, supra note 93, at 98 (proposing that any
comprehensive FOIL analysis requires a FOIA analysis because FOIL and FOIA maintain an
undisputed parallel relationship).
167. Fink, 393 N.E.2d at 466 n.1.
168. See Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 807, 833 (N.Y. 2018)
(emphasizing that because FOIL is modeled after FOIA, the Court of Appeals looks to federal
precedent when interpreting FOIL). In Abdur-Rashid, the court allowed the NYPD to adopt
the federal practice known as the Glomar doctrine—under which an agency can deny a records
request by failing to confirm or deny the existence of the records sought—because the very
fact that the agency possessed the records would reveal information protected by exemption.
See id. at 800, 813; see also Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
Glomar doctrine’s namesake stems from the D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding the CIA’s
refusal to confirm or deny the existence of documents related to the activities of the U.S.N.S.
Hughes Glomar Explorer ship (citing Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1109, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976))).
169. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 262 cmts. (McKinney 2021) (“In determining the construction
to be placed on an ambiguous statute, the [New York state] courts will seek light from
practically any source which may help in arriving at the meaning of the act . . . . [W]hile
federal decisions construing a federal statute are not binding on a New York state court
construing a similar state statute, they are highly persuasive, and uniformity in interpretation
is desirable.”).
170. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Barnwell, 351 S.E.2d 878, 881 (S.C. 1986).
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including California, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, as well as
the District of Columbia.171
Several states also adopt the federal standard for establishing an agency’s
burden to demonstrate that it performed an adequate search for documents.172
The Washington Supreme Court, in evaluating the adequacy of a Public
Records Act173 search, explicitly adopted the D.C. Circuit’s reasonableness
test and accepts “reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in
good faith” by an agency to meet their summary judgment burden.174 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland also utilizes the federal reasonableness test to
analyze a response to a Public Information Act175 request, emphasizing that
the requester is at a disadvantage because they do not know what records the
agency keeps or how the agency keeps them. 176 The Vermont Supreme
Court held that an agency will meet its burden in responding to a Public
Records Act177 request if it provides reasonable assurance of an adequate
search, which can include evidence of a “specified word search” for
responsive documents.178 Finally, in New Jersey, agency personnel
responding to an Open Public Records Act179 request must produce a
statement setting forth “in detail” the search undertaken to fulfill the request,
the responsive documents found, whether the documents or any part of the
documents are confidential, and information regarding the agency’s
document destruction policy.180
II. CERTIFYING A DILIGENT SEARCH IN PRACTICE: COMPARING
ACCEPTABLE SEARCH CERTIFICATIONS UNDER FOIL AND FOIA
FOIL’s legislative history demonstrates an intent to increase transparency
and access for citizens seeking records from state agencies,181 and the
statute’s plain language calls for agencies to certify that they performed a

171. See generally Joe Regalia, The Common Law Right to Information, 18 RICH. J.L. &
PUB. INT. 89, 113–14, 113 n.158 (2015).
172. Because this Note focuses on FOIL and its relation to FOIA, it only comments on
several states for comparison and does not undertake a fifty-state survey on how each state
evaluates the adequacy of an agency’s search. For more information on search obligations in
response to records requests under various state sunshine laws, see Open Government Guide:
Search Obligations, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-sections/1-search-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/G2Y5-SQFQ] (last visited Oct.
7, 2022).
173. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.001–42.56.904 (2022).
174. See Neighborhood All. of Spokane Cnty. v. Spokane Cnty., 261 P.3d 119, 127 (Wash.
2011).
175. 1970 Md. Laws 1970.
176. See Glass v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 160 A.3d 658, 676 (Md. 2017) (stressing that a
public records request should not be a game of “hide and seek”).
177. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 315–320 (2022).
178. See Toensing v. Att’y Gen. of Vt., 178 A.3d 1000, 1012–13 (Vt. 2017).
179. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1A-1 to 47:4-6 (2022).
180. See Paff v. N.J. Dep’t of Lab., 920 A.2d 731, 736 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
181. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1.
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diligent search to that end.182 While requesters argue that an agency’s
certification should provide either detail or personal knowledge about the
search, the New York Court of Appeals’s decision in Rattley set a lower
burden for agencies to confirm that they performed a diligent search
justifying a FOIL denial.183 FOIL requesters, unsatisfied with the court
paving the way for agencies’ denial and nondisclosure, argue that the Rattley
standard dissolves the statutory distinction between a search and a “diligent
search,” allows an agency to meet its burden by regurgitating FOIL’s
language, and obstructs meaningful judicial review of agency decisions.184
Part II.A analyzes the briefs filed by each party in the Rattley case to
illuminate the key arguments for what the certification standard should be.
Part II.B surveys examples of sufficient and insufficient diligent search
certifications, before and after the Rattley decision, to demonstrate how the
decision practically altered agencies’ burden of proof in FOIL litigation.
Finally, Part II.C outlines examples of sufficient and insufficient search
certifications under the federal reasonableness test to demonstrate the
different burdens placed on federal versus state agencies.
A. The Rattley Briefs: Evaluating the Certification of a Diligent Search
Section 89(3)(a) requires that an agency certify that a diligent search was
performed to justify its inability to locate the requested documents, and thus
properly deny a FOIL request.185 Despite the fact that FOIL’s requirement
that the search be “diligent” goes further than FOIA’s explicit search
requirements,186 the New York Court of Appeals notes in Rattley that FOIL
does not specify how an agency must certify that it performed a diligent
search.187 The Rattley opinion spans only two short pages, but the briefs
from the NYPD188 and the Office of the Appellate Defender189 (OAD) flesh
out the main arguments for whether courts should require a specific
description of the search or a statement from someone with personal
182. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3)(a) (McKinney 2022) (“[The agency] shall certify that
it does not have possession of such record or that such record cannot be found after diligent
search.”).
183. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001); infra Part II.B.
184. See infra Part II.B.
185. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a). FOIL does not define “certify” or “diligent.” See id. § 86.
But see generally Certify, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “certify” as
“[t]o authenticate or verify in writing” or “[t]o attest as being true or meeting certain criteria”);
Diligent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “diligent” as “[c]arried out with
care and steady effort”).
186. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D), with PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a); see supra Part I.B.1;
supra note 145 and accompanying text.
187. See Rattley, 756 N.E.2d at 58 (“The statute does not specify the manner in which an
agency must certify that documents cannot be located.”).
188. See Appellant’s Brief, Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001)
(No. 401325/98), 2000 WL 34030595.
189. See Brief for Off. of the App. Def. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Rattley v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001) (No. 401325/98), 2001 WL 34151431. The
Office of the Appellate Defender submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Peter Rattley,
who appeared pro se. See id. at *iii.
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knowledge of the search for an agency to meet their section 89(3)
certification obligation under FOIL.190
The NYPD argued that an agency should not be required to give a detailed
description of the search or an affirmation from the individual who carried
out the search, and it cited several previous New York State cases allowing
an agency to meet its burden under section 89(3) with similarly nondescript
certifications.191 The NYPD argued that Hynes, relied on by the OAD, was
distinguishable given its “unusual set of facts”: the certification that
documents could not be found after a diligent search proved to be incorrect
when the documents were later uncovered.192 The NYPD contended that a
court should presume that government officials under oath will not act
contrary to their official duties, therefore rendering the NYPD’s affirmation
sufficient unless the requester could prove otherwise.193 Finally, the NYPD
insisted that requiring a detailed description of the search or a statement from
individuals who performed the search would impose an “enormous burden”
on agencies, and especially on the NYPD, given the agency’s size and the
amount of FOIL requests that the agency receives.194
In opposition, the OAD argued that the court’s acceptance of conclusory
statements, lacking detail and made by persons without personal knowledge
of the search, would render section 89(3)’s certification requirement
“meaningless.”195 The OAD argued for an interpretation of “certify,” as used
in section 89(3), that requires the individual averring to the search performed
have personal knowledge of the search.196 Further, the OAD argued that a
certification lacking any detailed description of the search frustrates both the
chance for meaningful judicial review of the search197 and the ability of the
requester to then meet their burden and articulate a factual basis that the
190. See PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a).
191. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 188, at *7–9 (first citing Gould v. N.Y.C. Police
Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (N.Y. 1996); then Vandenburg v. Wagner, 704 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2000); and then Qayyam v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 642 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996)).
192. See id. at *10 (arguing that such a holding should be limited to similar circumstances
when a diligent search certification proves incorrect (citing Key v. Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d 926,
927–28 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994), invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d
56 (N.Y. 2001))).
193. See id. at *10–11 (citing In re Marcellus’ Est., 58 N.E. 796, 798 (N.Y. 1900) (“The
general presumption is that no official or person acting under an oath of office will do anything
contrary to his official duty, or omit anything which his official duty requires to be done.”));
see also Tesler, supra note 93, at 88–89 (arguing that the language of FOIL does not suspend
the “presumption of regularity” principle, which dictates that an agency’s representation that
they could not locate documents implies that a diligent search was performed absent a showing
to the contrary).
194. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 188, at *11–12.
195. See Brief for Off. of the App. Def. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
189, at *6.
196. See id. at *6–8 (citing Key v. Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t
1994) (finding the conclusory statement that a diligent search was performed was insufficient
to permit the court to determine whether the agency had indeed conducted the search, and
therefore requiring the agency to submit a more detailed affidavit), invalidated by Rattley v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001)).
197. See id. at *8–10.
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documents exist to secure a hearing on the issue.198 Finally, the OAD
emphasized that FOIL mandates broad public access to government records
despite the inherent burden posed to government agencies, and contended
that allowing an agency to deny requests with vague, conclusory statements
is antithetical to this purpose.199
Faced with two opposing interpretations of an agency’s FOIL obligation
to certify a diligent search, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the lower
standard more favorable to agencies200 and explicitly abrogated previous
appellate decisions to the contrary.201 In addition to shifting the certification
standard in New York state courts, the Rattley decision altered COOG
advisory opinions regarding FOIL’s certification requirements.202 The Court
of Appeals’s holding lowered the bar for agencies to demonstrate compliance
with FOIL, invalidated previous New York case law requiring more detail
from agencies,203 and created a foundation for future dismissals of
requesters’ challenges to FOIL denials.204
B. Comparing Sufficient Certifications Pre-Rattley and Post-Rattley
Part II.B explains how the Rattley decision relaxed an agency’s burden to
certify that a diligent search was performed—and thus satisfy its statutory
obligation under FOIL—when informing a requester that it could not find the
requested documents. The disparity between search certifications found to
be insufficient pre-Rattley and those found to be sufficiently diligent
post-Rattley illuminates Rattley’s practical effect on FOIL searches and
certifications. Part II.B.1 evaluates how the Rattley standard works in
practice to evaluate search certifications. Part II.B.2 examines how the
Rattley standard shifted the balance of burdens facing the agency and
requester in FOIL litigation. Finally, Part II.B.3 emphasizes the discrepancy
under Rattley between the justifications required to deny a request after a

198. See id. at *11–12.
199. See id. at *13 (“FOIL ‘imposes a broad duty to make certain records publicly available
irrespective of the private interests and the attendant burdens involved.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Gould v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (N.Y. 1996))); see also
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney 2022) (“An agency shall not deny a request on the
basis that the request is voluminous or that locating or reviewing the requested records or
providing the requested copies is burdensome . . . .”).
200. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001). The Rattley
opinion did not expand on its interpretation of FOIL’s certification requirement, only noting
the statute’s failure to specify how any agency must certify the search performed. See id. at
58.
201. See id. (“To the extent that some courts have held to the contrary, those decisions are
not to be followed.” (first citing Key v. Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994),
invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001); then Bellamy v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 708 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000); and then Sanders v. Bratton,
718 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000))).
202. See, e.g., Comm. on Open Gov’t, supra note 64 (directing FOIL requester to Rattley
holding for agency’s requirement to certify diligent search in New York state court, and noting
that Hynes was the previous standard before Rattley held to the contrary).
203. See Rattley, 756 N.E.2d at 58.
204. See infra Part II.B.
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diligent search under section 89(3) and those required to deny a request under
a specific section 87(2) exemption.
1. Rattley’s Lower Standard Changes New York State Courts’ Ability to
Weed Out Diligent Searches from Ineffective Searches
Rattley’s standard allowing an agency to meet its certification burden with
conclusory statements affects the ability of New York state courts to
determine whether the search was diligent and also threatens the capacity to
preserve the issue of the search’s diligence for subsequent review.205 Before
Rattley, in Hynes, the Second Department held that an assistant district
attorney’s affirmation that “[a]fter a diligent search, this office does not have
petitioner’s file”206 did not satisfy FOIL’s diligent search certification
requirement.207 The Hynes court found that the response containing “entirely
conclusory terms” did not permit the court to make a meaningful
determination as to whether the agency had actually performed a diligent
search as mandated by section 89(3).208 The Second Department’s holding
in Hynes emphasizes the utility of more-than-conclusory statements to
guarantee agency compliance with FOIL’s diligent search requirement and
to facilitate meaningful judicial review of an agency’s response to a FOIL
request in an Article 78 hearing.209 Before Rattley, New York courts
consistently applied the Hynes standard.210
The facts of the Hynes case highlight the practical implications of FOIL’s
requirement that agencies diligently search for documents. After an assistant
district attorney affirmed that the district attorney’s office did not have the
petitioner’s file, the requested file was subsequently found.211 Yet the
situation of an agency denying a request because its diligent search failed to
locate the documents, then subsequently finding the very same documents, is

205. See, e.g., Thomas v. Recs. Access Officer, 613 N.Y.S.2d 929, 929 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t
1994) (“[I]t is error to accept wholly conclusory allegations as a substitute for proof that an
agency governed by the Freedom of Information Law has been unable to locate a document
after having conducted a ‘diligent search.’” (quoting N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney
2022))), invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
206. Key v. Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d 926, 927–28 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994), invalidated by
Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
207. See id. at 928 (emphasizing that, in the FOIL context, conclusory allegations are
“legally valueless,” especially when made by an individual without direct knowledge of the
search at issue).
208. See id.
209. See id.; supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.
210. See Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 928; see also Bellamy v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 708
N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000), invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756
N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001); Sanders v. Bratton, 718 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000),
invalidated by Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001); Cuadrado v.
Morgenthau, 699 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999) (holding that a district
attorney did not sustain his burden of demonstrating that he diligently searched for files related
to a petitioner’s conviction, and ordering the district attorney to not only perform a diligent
search, but also to describe how his office stores videotapes); Thomas, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
211. See Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 927–28.
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not an anomaly unique to the Hynes case. In Davis v. Scott,212 an
incarcerated individual in New York brought an Article 78 proceeding
challenging the denial of his FOIL request by the New York City Department
of Correction (DOC). The Supreme Court of the State of New York, New
York County, found the agency’s conclusory memoranda—which stated that
a diligent search did not turn up any documents—to be insufficient to fulfill
its statutory burden.213 Subsequently, the court discovered that the DOC
employee who had written the memo that a diligent search had been
performed in fact did not search for the records at all because they were kept
at another DOC facility.214 When the court ordered the employee to call the
other facility about the requested records following a hearing, the records
were located “within minutes.”215
The realistic possibility that an agency’s search fails to uncover documents
requested by citizens under FOIL—even by honest mistake—highlights the
importance of the burden on an agency to demonstrate that they in fact
performed a diligent search, as well as the statutory mechanisms that allow
the court to review the search.216 Federal courts contemplating this
possibility hold that requested documents uncovered after the certification do
not necessarily render the certification insufficient, as long as the agency has
effectively demonstrated that the initial search was adequate.217 Yet
Rattley’s shift from requiring an agency to provide some detailed specificity
or personal knowledge about the search218 to requiring neither details about
the search nor personal knowledge219 hinders a court’s ability to evaluate the
search performed and to discern whether failure to find the requested
documents stems from honest mistake or lack of diligence.220
In Leibowicz v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance,221 the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Third Judicial
Department, applied Rattley and held that the agency’s affidavits stating that
a diligent search did not uncover requested documents satisfied its section
89(3) obligations.222 After the respondent’s certification, an additional
document that was “specifically identified” in the petitioner’s request was

212. N.Y. L.J., Nov. 23, 1999, at 32, https://opengovernment.ny.gov/system/files/
documents/2021/01/davis-v.-scott.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NVU-S9J2].
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. The New York County Supreme Court imposed sanctions on the DOC and
stated that further sanctions would be imposed if the records were not delivered in two days.
See id.
216. See, e.g., Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 927–28; Leibowicz v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n &
Fin., 919 N.Y.S.2d 917, 917 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).
217. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
219. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001).
220. See, e.g., Davis, N.Y. L.J., at 32 (finding bad faith and ordering sanctions when agency
personnel certified that a diligent search uncovered no documents, but the documents were
later located within minutes after one phone call).
221. 919 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).
222. See id.
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found and provided to the petitioner.223 However, the Third Department held
that the additional document’s discovery did not invalidate the respondent’s
certification because the agency satisfied its initial burden under Rattley.224
Since Rattley requires neither a detailed description of the search nor a
statement from an official with personal knowledge of the search,225 the court
must take the agency at its word that the search was diligent despite the
mistake, rather than assessing whether the agency’s efforts were diligent in
the first place.
2. How Rattley’s Burden-Shifting Framework Places the Burden on the
Requester to Justify Disclosure
New York cases in which courts have found that agency certifications do
not meet the Rattley standard and specified how an agency can cure the
deficiency demonstrate the ease with which agencies meet their burden to
certify a diligent search under Rattley. In Oddone v. Suffolk County Police
Department,226 the Second Department held that an officer’s assertion that a
diligent search did not produce requested documents was insufficient under
Rattley because the officer stated that “he had ‘been informed’ that a diligent
search had been conducted by an unidentified source.”227 The court noted
that because the assertion was not based on any evidence on the record, the
police department could not demonstrate that the determination was not
arbitrary and capricious.228 But following the appellate court’s decision, a
lower court found on remand that a subsequent affidavit from the police
department cured the initial deficiency.229 Although the two subsequent
police affidavits did not provide any additional details about the search, the
court held that they cured the initial deficiency because the officer submitting
them stated that she supervised the search.230
Additional rare cases in which an agency fails to meet its certification
burden under Rattley reveal that this standard effectively filters out cases in
which the agency indicates that no search was made at all and cases in which
the certification’s language does not match the language in section 89(3). In
Kairis v. Fischer,231 an incarcerated individual submitted a FOIL request for
documents relating to his lost property claim.232 He received no response
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001).
226. 946 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012).
227. Id. at 583 (quoting assertion by an officer).
228. See id.
229. See Oddone v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 002036/2011, 2013 WL 361143 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001)).
An employee of the Suffolk County Police Department submitted two affidavits. See id. The
first affidavit stated that an additional diligent search was conducted, producing no documents.
See id. The second affidavit added that the employee supervised the search, but did not add
details regarding the steps taken in the search for documents. See id.
230. See id.
231. 973 N.Y.S.2d 887 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013).
232. See id. at 888.
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because the records coordinator mistakenly believed that the request had
been withdrawn, and the court remitted the matter because the agency
certification revealed that no search was performed at all.233 In Baez v.
Brown,234 the Second Department held that an agency’s statement did not
meet the certification requirement under Rattley because the statement read
that “nothing in the case file met [the petitioner’s] description of these
items.”235 Here, the Second Department remanded the matter to the lower
court because the certification did not state that the search was “diligent.”236
These cases indicate that the Rattley standard filters out certifications that fail
to produce evidence of any search at all,237 as well as statements that fail to
include the language in section 89(3),238 and that an agency can easily cure
a deficiency to meet its Rattley burden.239
After an agency meets the low bar for certifying compliance with FOIL’s
diligent search requirement under Rattley, the burden then shifts back to the
requester, who faces a high bar in rebutting the agency’s certification to earn
a hearing on the issue of the search’s diligence.240 In Jackson v. Albany
County District Attorney’s Office,241 a criminal defendant commenced an
Article 78 proceeding after his numerous FOIL requests to the Albany
County district attorney for photographs relating to his criminal case elicited
no response.242 An assistant district attorney then stated that, based on his
review of the records and from conversations with the staff that maintained
records, no records could be found after a diligent search.243 Citing Rattley,
the Third Department held that the assistant district attorney’s averment
satisfied the office’s section 89(3) diligent search obligation.244 The
requester then introduced a police department property report listing a roll of
233. See id.
234. 1 N.Y.S.3d 376 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015).
235. Id. at 380 (quoting statement by a records access officer). In Baez, an incarcerated
individual submitted a FOIL request for documents relating to his trial and conviction. See id.
at 378. After denying certain requested documents pursuant to FOIL exemptions, the records
access officer also denied certain materials because she stated that she could not find them.
See id. at 378–80.
236. See id. at 380.
237. See Kairis, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 888; see also Thomas v. Kane, 163 N.Y.S.3d 464,
465–66 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2022) (finding respondent police department’s diligent search
certification to be insufficient because respondent certified that a diligent search did not
uncover dashboard camera video, whereas petitioner requested information regarding the
retention of dashboard camera video, not the video itself).
238. See Baez, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 380.
239. See Oddone v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 002036/2011, 2013 WL 361143 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2013).
240. See Gould v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (N.Y. 1996) (noting that if
agency meets its burden to certify a diligent search, FOIL requester can rebut the certification
and receive a hearing if they can “articulate a demonstrable factual basis to support [the]
contention” that the agency possesses the documents).
241. 113 N.Y.S.3d 313 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2019).
242. See id.
243. See id. at 315. The assistant district attorney also stated that if the records did
previously exist, they were either not maintained by the respondent or could not be found by
the respondent after a diligent search. See id.
244. See id. (citing Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001)).
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film as evidence that the photographs in fact existed, but the court held that
this did not constitute a “demonstrable factual basis . . . that the requested
documents existed and were within the entity’s control” sufficient to earn a
hearing to review the agency’s search.245
In Oddone, the petitioner was able to meet the high
demonstrable-factual-basis standard needed to rebut the agency’s
assertion.246 There, in response to a FOIL request, the police department
turned over only about eighty pages of documents from eighteen witness
interviews, but the petitioner averred that there were seventy witnesses in the
criminal trial, and that a police officer had testified with a six-inch binder full
of documents.247 However, many more requesters lack the compelling
evidence to meet the high standard and are denied a hearing to review agency
search efforts248 as in Jackson.249 In Gould v. New York City Police
Department,250 for example, the petitioner’s statement that the requested
documents previously existed was insufficient to form a demonstrable factual
basis needed to grant a hearing on the diligence issue.251 In DeFreitas v. New
York State Police Crime Lab,252 although the agency produced 1,356 pages
of requested DNA testing documents relating to an incarcerated individual’s
conviction, the requester was not able to establish a demonstrable factual
basis that documents relating to the discrepancy and error rates behind that
same DNA testing existed.253 FOIL’s legislative history demonstrates an
intent to place the burden of nondisclosure on the agency, 254 but Rattley
allows agencies to easily shift the burden back to the requester. This leaves
petitioners who cannot generate sufficient evidence without legal recourse in
the form of a hearing guaranteed under section 89(4) and without the
requested documents guaranteed under section 89(3).

245. Id. (quoting Gould v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (N.Y. 1996)).
246. See Oddone v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 946 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t
2012); see also Surveillance Tech. Oversight Project v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t,
No. 156442/2021, 2021 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6780, at *8–11 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 2021) (finding
petitioner met demonstrable-factual-basis standard to prove that NYPD possessed materials
related to accuracy and bias of facial recognition software—despite NYPD’s diligent search
certification to the contrary—by highlighting the existence of publicly available NYPD
documents that specifically referenced source materials relied on in developing department
protocols for facial recognition technology).
247. See Oddone, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
248. See Tesler, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
249. See Jackson, 113 N.Y.S.3d at 315 (finding that submission of police department report
listing roll of film was insufficient to articulate demonstrable factual basis that department
possessed photographs).
250. 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (N.Y. 1996).
251. See id.
252. 35 N.Y.S.3d 598 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2016).
253. See id. at 599–600.
254. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.

2022]

SHINING A LIGHT ON RATTLEY

711

3. Rattley’s Reliance on Formalism over Substance to Assess the
Adequacy of an Agency’s Search
Under Rattley, New York state courts allow agencies to certify that they
performed a diligent search uncovering no documents without providing a
detailed description of the underlying search.255 Conversely, courts do not
allow agencies to justify a denial under a specific section 87(2) exemption
using similarly nondescript certifications, instead requiring a showing of
particularized suspicion.256 In McFadden v. Fonda,257 an incarcerated
individual filed a FOIL request with the police for forensic evidence from
three victims in his criminal case.258 The police provided the evidence for
one victim, denied the request for the next victim on the grounds that a
diligent search did not uncover responsive records, and denied the request for
the final victim pursuant to a FOIL law enforcement exemption.259
In an Article 78 proceeding challenging the denials, the Third Department
held that the section 89(3) denial based on a diligent search producing no
documents was proper under Rattley,260 but the section 87(2) denial pursuant
to a FOIL exemption was improper.261 The court found that the police did
not demonstrate specific justifications as to why the requested record was
exempted from disclosure under FOIL, but instead “merely paraphrased the
statutory language of the exemptions without describing the records withheld
or providing any factual basis for its conclusory assertions.”262 Thus, the
court allowed the agency to parrot FOIL’s language to meet its burden for a
denial after a diligent search under Rattley, but did not allow the agency to
similarly paraphrase the statutory language to meet its burden of proof for a
denial pursuant to a specific exemption.
In Grabell v. New York City Police Department,263 the requester brought
an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the NYPD’s denial of a FOIL request
for documents relating to the NYPD’s use of Z Backscatter Vans to combat
terrorism.264 The First Department held that the NYPD’s section 87(2)
denial of certain requested documents pursuant to specific exemptions was
improper, but that its section 89(3) denial of documents based on a statement
that a diligent search failed to produce requested documents was proper.265
The court held that the NYPD’s affidavit did not adequately explain how

255. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001).
256. See Gould, 675 N.E.2d at 811 (explaining that “to invoke one of the exemptions of
section 87(2), the agency must articulate ‘particularized and specific justification’ for not
disclosing requested documents” (quoting Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y.
1979))).
257. 50 N.Y.S.3d 605 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2017).
258. See id. at 607.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 608 (citing Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001)).
261. See id. at 608–09.
262. Id. at 609.
263. 32 N.Y.S.3d 81 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2016).
264. See id. at 83–84.
265. See id. at 84.
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documents concerning the van’s radiation and health effects could be
exploited by terrorists, thus allowing for the records to fall under the specific
exemption,266 but accepted the NYPD’s affidavit averring that they
conducted a diligent search without further justification.267 The First
Department therefore found that the lower court erred in ordering the NYPD
to submit an affidavit describing the search.268
The decisions in McFadden and Grabell uncover New York state courts’
acceptance of formalism, focusing on whether the agency’s denial contains
the proper language rather than substantively evaluating the actual diligence
of the search performed under Rattley. The Hynes court emphasized that the
requirement of evidentiary proof—and the notion that conclusory statements
are insufficient to supply such proof—applies equally when an agency denies
a FOIL request because they cannot find a document or when a document is
exempted from disclosure.269 New York state courts maintain a high burden
of proof to justify a section 87(2) denial by exemption,270 but allow agencies
to justify a section 89(3) denial by paraphrasing FOIL’s language.271 Given
this disparity between the burden of proof facing an agency seeking to justify
a section 87(2) denial compared to when it seeks to justify a section 89(3)
denial, the inability to locate documents becomes an advantage for the
agency, given the easier path for justifying final denial under Rattley.
C. Comparing Acceptable Certifications of Adequate Searches Under the
Federal Standard and the Rattley Standard
While New York state courts relying on Rattley do not require an agency
to supply either a detailed description of the search or a statement from the
official who performed the search to affirm the search’s adequacy,272 federal
courts require more. When a FOIA requester challenges the adequacy of an
266. See id. In Grabell, petitioner requested documents pertaining to the NYPD’s use of
Z Backscatter Vans. See id. at 83. To demonstrate that the requested documents were
exempted, deputy commissioner of intelligence and counterterrorism Richard Daddario
provided an affidavit explaining how releasing information about the NYPD’s operational
tactics and strategy would undermine ongoing counterterrorism operations and increase the
likelihood of another terrorist attack. See id. at 84. While the court held that the affidavit
properly established that most of the documents were exempted from disclosure under FOIL,
the court found that the affidavit did not explain how tests and reports about radiation and
other health effects from the vans qualified for FOIL’s law enforcement exemption, and
concluded that the lower court properly directed the NYPD to disclose those documents. See
id. at 83–84.
267. See id. at 84 (citing Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001)).
268. See id.
269. See Key v. Hynes, 613 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994) (“There is no
basis in law or in reason to apply . . . a rule any different from the general rule of civil practice
which states that conclusory allegations . . . are legally valueless.”), invalidated by Rattley v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001).
270. See, e.g., McFadden v. Fonda, 50 N.Y.S.3d 605, 608–09 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2017);
Grabell, 32 N.Y.S.3d at 84.
271. See McFadden, 50 N.Y.S.3d at 608; Grabell, 32 N.Y.S.3d at 84; see also Baez v.
Brown, 1 N.Y.S.3d 376, 380 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015) (holding that agency’s certification
failing to contain averment as to diligence in search performed did not meet Rattley standard).
272. See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001).
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agency’s search, the agency must show that it has “conducted a search
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,”273 and it can meet
this burden by producing a “reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the
search terms and the type of search performed.”274 Unlike New York state
courts, the D.C. Circuit requires a reasonable amount of detail regarding the
search so that a requester can meaningfully challenge the adequacy of the
search, and a district court can effectively evaluate whether the search was
adequate.275 If any agency’s affidavit lacks such detail and leaves doubt as
to whether the agency performed a sufficient FOIA search, ruling for the
agency at summary judgment is improper.276
The federal reasonableness standard requires more than a conclusory
affidavit from an agency to meet its FOIA burden. The result is that,
compared to New York agencies, federal agencies provide more detail about
their searches to requesters and courts to justify a denial.277 In Freedom
Watch, Inc. v. National Security Agency,278 the NSA met its burden by
providing declarations outlining the full-text electronic searches used to look
for terms relevant to the FOIA request.279 In Baker & Hostetler LLP v.
United States Department of Commerce,280 the D.C. Circuit held that the
U.S. Department of Commerce met its burden by providing an affidavit
outlining in detail the manner and method of the searches conducted.281 On
the other hand, in Morley v. Central Intelligence Agency,282 the D.C. Circuit
held that the CIA’s declaration that “records . . . were a product of a
reasonable, diligent and thorough search” did not provide the court with
enough detail to assess the search’s adequacy.283 Because federal courts
require more detailed certifications than New York courts do under Rattley,
district courts can discern what searches are sufficient based on the facts of

273. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The D.C.
Circuit emphasizes that the agency need not provide the meticulous details of a massive search
but must provide an adequately reasonable description of the search. See Perry v. Block, 684
F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
274. Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
275. See id. (emphasizing that such an affidavit is “necessary to afford a FOIA requester
an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the search and to allow the district court to
determine if the search was adequate”).
276. See Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
277. See, e.g., Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 559–60 (1st Cir. 1993) (establishing that a
satisfactory affidavit should at least describe the search’s scope and methods, as well as the
general layout of the agency’s filing system).
278. 783 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
279. See id. at 1345.
280. 473 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
281. See id. at 318.
282. 508 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
283. Id. at 1121, 1124 (“[V]ague, conclusory affidavits, or those that merely paraphrase the
words of a statute, do not allow a reviewing judge to safeguard the public’s right of access to
government records.” (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc. v. Turner, 662 F.2d 784,
787 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
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the search performed and develop jurisprudence on what constitutes an
adequate search, unlike New York state courts.284
Federal courts afford agency affidavits a presumption of good faith,285 but
this presumption only applies once an agency meets its initial burden of proof
with a reasonably detailed affidavit attesting to the search performed.286
Once the agency meets its initial burden, the burden shifts back to the
requester, who can then rebut the agency’s affidavit only with evidence of
the agency’s bad faith.287 The contrast between the burden-shifting
frameworks in federal court and New York state court illuminates the more
difficult path for challenging an agency’s denial under FOIL than under
FOIA. Federal courts afford a presumption of good faith only after the
agency meets its initial burden with reasonable detail,288 and the good-faith
presumption does not substitute for the need to demonstrate the search’s
adequacy.289 But under Rattley, because an agency need not provide details
and can meet its burden by parroting FOIL’s language, a New York state
agency’s certification receives a de facto presumption of good faith, and the
burden swings back to the requester quasi-automatically.290
The burden-shifting in Rattley—favorable to agencies and unfavorable to
requesters—is especially detrimental to citizens in sunshine law litigation
because the agency alone has knowledge of the documents it possesses and
information about the searches it performs.291 During FOIL’s enactment and
amendment, New York legislators recognized this same imbalance favoring
the agency and therefore intended for the agency to bear the burden of proof
to justify nondisclosure.292 But Rattley creates a lighter burden on New York
284. See, e.g., id. at 1124; Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1990); supra Part II.B.
285. See, e.g., Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
286. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Carney, 19 F.3d at 812.
287. See Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 560 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that a sufficient agency
affidavit cannot be rebutted by “purely speculative claims about the existence and
discoverability of other documents” (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d
770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
288. See Carney, 19 F.3d at 812.
289. See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
290. Compare Carney, 19 F.3d at 812, with Grabell v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 32 N.Y.S.3d
81, 84 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2016); see also supra note 193 and accompanying text.
291. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824–25 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasizing that only
agencies have the information necessary to categorize documents as exempt from disclosure,
and that the lack of knowledge held by requesters “seriously distorts the traditional adversary
nature of our legal system . . . .” where both sides should generally have access to relevant
facts); see also A. Jay Wagner, “Longstanding, Systemic Weaknesses”: Hillary Clinton’s
Emails, FOIA’s Defects and Affirmative Disclosure, 29 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359,
391–92 (2019) (concluding that the “inherent imbalance of the requestor release system”
disfavors FOIA requesters and favors agencies because agencies protect their time and
resources, while requesters only pursue their requested records, resulting in the court
presuming good faith on behalf of agency searches).
292. See Press Release, Mario M. Cuomo, supra note 51 (emphasizing that the 1977 FOIL
amendments allocate burden of proof of record denial to the agency); Esposito, supra note 52
(arguing that placing the burden of proof on the requester to justify disclosure is inconsistent
with FOIL’s presumption of disclosure and access); Letter from Robert J. Dryfoos to Judah
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agencies to certify the adequacy of their search and removes a key incentive
that compels document disclosure.293 On the contrary, federal courts
maintain this incentive by requiring a search reasonably calculated to
uncover the documents, as well as a reasonably detailed affidavit describing
the search performed.294 Federal courts are not alone in maintaining a
reasonableness standard. State courts in Washington,295 Maryland,296
Vermont,297 and New Jersey298 require agencies to provide a reasonable level
of detail about the search performed to ensure compliance with the state’s
sunshine law. After Rattley, New York agencies face less resistance on the
path to nondisclosure and denial, while requesters in federal court seeking
documents under FOIA—as well as requesters in states that apply a
reasonableness standard—benefit from a stronger likelihood of successfully
receiving documents.
III. REVISITING RATTLEY: JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO
REALIGN THE DILIGENT SEARCH STANDARD WITH FOIL’S PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE
The time is now for the New York Court of Appeals and the New York
state legislature to revisit FOIL and rectify the deficiencies of the diligent
search certification standard under Rattley. In unprecedented times when
everyday citizens rely with increasing urgency on the guidance and action of
their state—particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic299—transparency,
accountability, and access to information matter. FOIL guarantees such
access, but Rattley warps New York’s sunshine law into a broken promise.
Part III.A summarizes how New York State’s current standard for evaluating
an agency’s diligent search certification under Rattley fails to effectively
distinguish diligent searches from ineffective ones, creates inequitable
burdens favoring agencies and disfavoring requesters, and allows agencies to
meet their burden of proof by paraphrasing FOIL’s language instead of
adequately describing their search efforts. Part III.B argues that the New
York Court of Appeals should adopt the federal reasonableness test and
explains why the federal test realigns New York’s diligent search standard
with FOIL’s presumption of disclosure. Part III.C proposes a potential
legislative solution if New York state courts fail to adopt the federal
reasonableness test.

Gribetz, supra note 53 (noting that FOIL procedure favors the agency because it can base
arguments on intimate knowledge of documents that requester lacks).
293. See supra Part II.B.
294. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
295. See, e.g., Neighborhood All. of Spokane Cnty. v. Spokane Cnty., 261 P.3d 119,
127–29 (Wash. 2011).
296. See, e.g., Glass v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 160 A.3d 658, 676 (Md. 2017).
297. See, e.g., Toensing v. Att’y Gen. of Vt., 178 A.3d 1000, 1012–13 (Vt. 2017).
298. See, e.g., Paff v. N.J. Dep’t of Lab., 920 A.2d 731, 736 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
299. See supra notes 10–16.
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A. Rattley’s Application Weakens the Diligent Search Requirement, Robs
Requesters of Meaningful Judicial Review, and Conflicts with FOIL’s
Promise of Document Disclosure
New York legislators deliberately designed FOIL in the likeness of FOIA
to increase the public’s access to government records,300 yet the Rattley
holding has the opposite effect. FOIL’s language requires an agency to
certify that it performed a “diligent” search,301 but conclusory affidavits from
agencies averring to a search without any detail, acceptable under Rattley,
cloud the ability of courts and requesters alike to discern whether an agency
performed an adequate, diligent search.302
Examples from this Note demonstrate the low bar for agencies under
Rattley. The burden only functionally rejects affidavits that fail to mention
any search at all303 or fail to even paraphrase the statute’s language.304
Concurrently, the low bar risks letting many inadequate searches fall through
the cracks—in particular, those that fail to uncover requested documents due
to a lack of careful attention, incompetence, laziness, gross negligence, or
even malice.305 FOIL’s diligent search certification requirement should
function as a mechanism both for compelling agency officials to perform
careful searches on behalf of requesters and for allowing a court to review
the agency’s efforts to comply with FOIL when challenged in court. Rattley
does not advance these goals.
Because sunshine law litigation inherently disadvantages the requester
given their lack of knowledge regarding an agency’s documents, New York
legislators intended the agency to bear the burden of justifying
nondisclosure.306 But the Rattley standard allows agencies to easily shift the
burden back to the requester to justify disclosure.307 Under Rattley, the
agency faces a low bar, requiring neither detail nor personal knowledge to
justify its denial, while the requester—unfamiliar with the documents they
seek or the search allegedly performed by the agency—faces a higher burden
when requesting a hearing on the agency’s search.308 FOIL affords the
requester a statutory path for challenging the agency’s compliance with FOIL
in court, but Rattley stacks the deck against the requester by setting a low
burden for the agency to demonstrate compliance, all while the requester’s
high bar remains unchanged.309 FOIL theoretically maintains a presumption
of disclosure by placing the burden on the agency to justify denying
documents legally guaranteed to the public.310 But contrary to this
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra Part I.A.1.
See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3)(a) (McKinney 2022).
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3.
See supra Part II.B.1; supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.A.1, II.C; supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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underlying premise, under Rattley, courts take the agency at its word without
requiring specific proof about the search’s adequacy,311 and leave it to the
ill-equipped requester to prove their right to access records.
B. Implementing the Federal Reasonableness Test as a Viable Solution to
Correct the Diligent Search Certification Standard in New York
State Courts
The New York Court of Appeals should overturn Rattley and adopt the
federal reasonableness standard to determine whether an agency has met its
burden of proof in demonstrating compliance with FOIL’s diligent search
certification requirement.312 The federal test more effectively weeds out
inadequate document searches at the summary judgment stage,313 ensures
that the burden rests with the agency to justify its inability to find
documents,314 and sustains the requester’s right to meaningful judicial
review of agency decisions by requiring a reasonable level of detail regarding
the search.315 New York legislators enacted and amended FOIL specifically
to incorporate FOIA’s presumption of disclosure,316 and New York courts
have previously held that federal FOIA jurisprudence is instructive in New
York FOIL litigation.317 Not only are FOIL and FOIA similar statutes, but
FOIL goes further than FOIA by requiring a “diligent” search for
documents.318 Adopting the federal reasonableness test is the logical next
step in aligning FOIL with FOIA and ensuring that New York’s sunshine law
preserves a presumption of disclosure, transparency, and access.
In its brief to the New York Court of Appeals arguing for a low burden,
the NYPD argued in Rattley that a higher burden of proof requiring more
detail about the search was applicable only to instances where documents
were found after the search was certified.319 The NYPD further contended
that a presumption of regularity—an assumption that government officials
under oath will not act contrary to their duty—attaches to all agency action,
and that a high certification standard would impose enormous burdens on
agencies.320 The NYPD’s arguments in Rattley were successful and formed
the basis for the current standard used by New York state courts.321
However, implementing the federal reasonableness standard would not lead
to the dangers raised by the NYPD for several reasons.
First, cases in which requested documents were found after an agency’s
certification that they could not find them demonstrate that the facts of Hynes
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3)(a) (McKinney 2022).
See supra Parts II.B.1, II.C.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.3; see also supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A; see also supra note 192.
See supra Part II.A; see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
See Rattley v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 756 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 2001).
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are not unique, and that documents routinely slip through the cracks during
searches.322 FOIL guarantees citizens the right to access all documents that
are not specifically exempted,323 and therefore the chance that a search fails
to uncover requested documents emphasizes the need for effective review of
an agency’s search. The federal test achieves this result more effectively than
the Rattley standard by requiring a reasonable description of the scope and
methods of the search, as well as a description of the agency’s filing system,
for judges and requesters to evaluate.324 The Rattley standard fails to
similarly distinguish inadequate searches from diligent ones, and instead
allows all agencies to regurgitate FOIL’s language certifying a diligent
search regardless of the level of diligence used.325 Finally, the federal
standard bakes in the possibility that some documents will be missed and
specifically evaluates the adequacy of the search itself, rather than its results,
at the summary judgment stage.326
Second, the federal reasonableness test affords a presumption of good faith
toward agency affidavits,327 in line with New York case law,328 but reserves
affording a presumption of good faith until after the agency has met its initial
burden of demonstrating that it performed a search reasonably calculated to
uncover the requested documents.329 In practice, under Rattley, a
presumption of regularity attaches to the agency’s affidavit too early. The
good-faith presumption, instead of attaching to an agency affidavit that
provides reasonable detail of the search performed, swallows the agency’s
requirement to certify the diligent search.330
New York legislators designed FOIL so that citizens did not need to take
bureaucrats at their word and could review the documents and statistics
underlying the agency decisions affecting them.331 FOIL’s built-in
mechanisms for a requester to challenge the agency’s denial, both
administratively and through an Article 78 proceeding, discredit the idea that
a presumption of regularity should supplant the agency’s burden to
demonstrate compliance under FOIL.332 The federal test, which grants this
presumption after the agency has met its initial burden, keeps the burden on
the agency to demonstrate its statutory compliance when justifying the

322. See supra Part II.B.1; supra note 156 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 50.
324. See supra Part II.C; supra note 277 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part II.B.3.
326. See supra notes 156–58.
327. See supra note 285.
328. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part II.C.
330. See supra Part II.C; supra notes 288–90 and accompanying text.
331. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 2022) (“The people’s right to know the
process of governmental decision-making and to review the documents and statistics leading
to determinations is basic to our society. Access to such information should not be thwarted
by shrouding it with the cloak of secrecy or confidentiality.”).
332. See supra Parts I.A.2–3.
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nondisclosure of documents, and aligns more properly with FOIL’s
legislative intent for the agency to bear the burden of nondisclosure.333
Third, adoption of the federal test by the New York Court of Appeals will
not overburden state agencies. The cornerstone of the federal test is
reasonableness334—agencies need not boil the ocean, find the needle in the
haystack, or leave no stone unturned when searching for documents
responsive to a FOIA request. Federal courts do not require a statement from
every single agency official who searched for documents, but will consider
affidavits from the search’s supervisor.335 Furthermore, not only has the
D.C. Circuit utilized the test for over thirty years,336 but the adoption of the
federal standard by several states,337 including New York’s neighbor, New
Jersey,338 suggests that the test is viable. Finally, FOIL’s text recognizes that
searches for documents can be burdensome and specifically notes that a
burdensome search is not an appropriate reason for an agency to deny a FOIL
request.339
C. A Legislative Amendment as an Alternative Solution for Resolving
FOIL’s Ambiguity and Placing the Burden on Agencies to Demonstrate
FOIL Compliance
If the New York Court of Appeals fails to adopt the reasonableness test,
the New York state legislature can implement language clarifying how an
agency must certify that it performed a diligent search and emphasizing the
agency’s burden to prove its compliance with FOIL’s diligent search
requirement. To that end, this Note suggests making the following addition
to New York Public Officers Law section 89(4)(b):
In the event that access to any record is denied because such record cannot
be found after diligent search pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a) of
subdivision three of section eighty-nine of this article, the agency involved
shall have the burden of proving that the search was diligent, and shall do
so by means of a reasonably detailed affidavit. 340

This added provision would solve FOIL’s ambiguity as to how an agency
must certify a diligent search341 and would allow New York courts to
determine the diligence of a search on a case-by-case basis.342 This

333. See supra notes 51–53, 288–90 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part I.B.2; supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
336. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983); supra Part
I.B.2.
337. See supra Part I.C.2.
338. See supra notes 179–80.
339. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3)(a) (McKinney 2022).
340. This Note recommends that the proposed addition fall in section 89(4)(b) before the
last sentence, “Failure by an agency to conform . . . shall constitute a denial.” See id.
§ 89(4)(b).
341. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
342. See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. CV 15-687, 2021 WL 3363423, at *3
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2021) (noting that the adequacy of a search depends on the facts of each case).
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clarification of FOIL’s ambiguous language would set a clear path for the
courts to implement a reasonableness test as required by statute.
The proposed legislative amendment to section 89(4)(b) further resets the
burden-shifting framework misconstrued under Rattley. Federal courts
ruling on FOIA cases343 and New York legislators designing and amending
FOIL344 recognized the importance of placing the burden on the government
to justify nondisclosure, as opposed to placing the burden on the requester to
justify disclosure. In the game of document disclosure, the agency holds all
the cards—without placing the burden on the agency to show its hand and
reveal details about its search, neither requesters nor judges can evaluate
whether the agency complied with FOIL’s requirement to diligently search
for requested documents.345 FOIL adamantly maintains that “government is
the public’s business,”346 and the adoption of the federal reasonableness test
by New York courts or the enactment of the legislative amendment proposed
by this Note will ensure that New York makes good on FOIL’s promise.
CONCLUSION
FOIL promises transparency, access, and disclosure to the citizens of New
York, but the New York Court of Appeals’s holding in Rattley has hampered
the people’s right to know. The Rattley standard fails to distinguish diligent
searches from lackluster ones, allowing agencies to skirt disclosure and
leaving New York FOIL requesters helpless to challenge the agency’s denial.
In sunshine law litigation, the requester is already at a disadvantage as only
the agency possesses the relevant information regarding the documents at
hand. But Rattley leaves requesters in New York in a worse position than
their counterparts requesting documents in federal court or in other states that
have adopted the federal standard. This Note argues that, in an age where
governmental transparency is pivotal, the New York Court of Appeals should
replace Rattley with the federal reasonableness test—a viable solution that
strengthens the courts’ ability to accurately assess agency compliance with
FOIL’s diligent search requirement, resets the burden equilibrium between
the requester and agency, and restores FOIL’s original promise of disclosure.

343.
344.
345.
346.

See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 283, 291 and accompanying text; PUB. OFF. § 89(3)(a).
PUB. OFF. § 84.

